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Patricia E. Perkins
While NAFTA contains more "green" language
than any previous trade pact, the agreement is also
unprecedented in the freedom it allows investors and
the extent to which it curtails government policy
flexibility - important areas of concern for the
environment. Especially in Canada, where
environmental policy is primarily a provincial
responsibility, questions have arisen about the
workability and constitutionality of federally-negotiated
international agreements like NAFTA which may have
broad impacts on the ability of provincial governments
to regulate and set environmental policy. Without
embarking on constitutional questions in detail, this
paper briefly explores some of the environmental
policy issues raised by NAFTA.
In order to facilitate trade in goods, NAFTA sets
out limitations on the types of standards which
countries may legitimately use to ban the import of
goods for health, safety, or other reasons. NAFTA's
rules apply to all standards that "may, directly or
indirectly, affect trade in goods or services" between
the NAFTA countries (Article 901). Many
environmental regulations fall into this category -
both those relating to traded products themselves (such
as allowable levels of pesticides on fruit) and to
production processes (such as smelter emissions
standards), since compliance with these environmental
standards affects the producers' costs and the price of
the traded goods.'
Jurisdictions are expected, under NAFTA, to base
their standards on international ones, and to work
toward harmonizing their standards with those in the
other NAFTA countries (Articles 905 and 906). This
may lead, in principle, to pressure on jurisdictions to
accept a lowest common denominator as the acceptable
standard, despite language designed to reduce the
downward impact of standards harmonization.
Currently, a wide range of types of environmental
regulation exist in different jurisdictions for a variety
of ecological, political, and historical reasons.
Adoption of international standards could set back
hard-won environmental and health advances in some
countries. Such provisions also threaten the
progressive evolution of environmental policy, since
any jurisdiction which takes the lead in a particular
regulatory direction could be more likely to face a
trade challenge.
In the event of a standards-related trade dispute,
the onus would fall on the country with higher
standards to prove that they are intended to meet a
legitimate objective, that they do "not operate to
exclude imported goods which meet that legitimate
objective," and that they do not discriminate between
foreign and domestic firms (Articles 904 and 301). A
NAFTA panel of trade experts decides any dispute
which may arise, and if a standard is deemed to
violate NAFTA, it must be rescinded or revised, or
else the offending jurisdiction faces trade sanctions
approved by the NAFTA panel (Articles 2004, 2018
and 2019).
NAFTA states that, like the standards themselves,
jurisdictions are to harmonize their standards
enforcement procedures. The agreement sets out
detailed rules concerning how standards should be
enforced (Articles 906 and 908). The North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation similarly
focuses on national enforcement of national laws and
regulations, and on procedures for harmonizing rules
and their enforcement. Thus, many aspects of the
operations of government agencies charged with
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overseeing compliance with environmental regulations
may also be affected by NAFTA's implementation.
This has a wide range of budget implications and
could skew government allocation of funds for
environmental protection.
More than previous trade agreements, which deal
almost exclusively with trade in goods, in general
NAFTA emphasizes investment, trade in financial and
other services, "intellectual property" rights, and
access by individual investors to dispute settlement
procedures. Investment shifts associated with NAFTA
are likely to bring environmental protection measures
under increasing pressure in all NAFTA countries.
NAFTA's Investment Chapter contains a provision
which states that the three NAFTA countries should
not waive or weaken their existing environmental
measures as a means of attracting investment (Article
1114). This clause is the principal attempt in NAFTA
to address the possibility that investment shifts
following NAFTA's implementation could lead to the
growth of "pollution havens" (jurisdictions with
relatively lax environmental laws, where costs are
lower but goods can be freely exported to the other
markets). The non-binding language used in Article
1114 gives it little clout. Moreover, it does not
address pre-existing differences in the environmental
policy framework among the NAFTA countries.
Any increase in trade associated with NAFTA
implies that more goods are transported farther than
before. Increased transport of goods places new strains
on existing transportation infrastructure and causes
increased energy use, pollution, resource depletion,
waste generation, and climate change. It also increases
political pressures for the development of
transportation infrastructures, and decreased regulation
and taxation of transportation. For similar political
reasons, wider demand for raw materials may set back
conservation initiatives and/or lead to more rapid
depletion of resources.
International environmental agreements often use
trade sanctions against non-signatories to encourage
compliance. NAFTA permits several such pacts -
including the Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting
substances, the Basel Convention on waste transfers,
and the CITES agreement regarding endangered
species - to supersede NAFTA if conflicts arise. All
NAFTA parties would have to agree before any future
international environmental agreements would be
allowed to take precedence over NAFTA (Article
104). This, effectively, could allow any one NAFTA
party to veto its trading partners' flexibility to become
active partners in future agreements designed to
address global environmental issues ( e.g. biodiversity,
forestry, climate change, or Arctic pollution).
NAFTA's energy chapter, from which Mexico
negotiated an exclusion, prohibits nearly all
quantitative restrictions on energy exports (Articles
603 through 607, and Annexes to Chapter 6). The
"proportionality clause" of the Canada - U.S. Free
Trade Agreement is continued in NAFTA (Article
605). This clause states that even in an energy supply
emergency, NAFTA countries must continue to export
an amount proportional to the average of exports to
total energy production during the three preceding
years. All NAFTA parties but Mexico may thus be
prevented from acting to meet domestic needs first in
an energy crisis. Other goods, apparently including
water, are covered by the same rules (Article 315).
Government action is central to virtually all
efforts to internalize environmental costs of production
and implement the widely-accepted "polluter pays"
principle, thus making economies more sustainable. In
Canada, it is primarily provincial governments which
face this challenge. The chilling of progressive
environmental policy because of fiscal contraction and
fear of trade disputes may be NAFTA's broadest and
longest-term negative environmental legacy.
The argument that trade-induced economic growth
will make more financial resources available to devote
to environmental protection has been contested by
many environmentalists, who argue that tax revenues
are unlikely to rise in Canada due to competition for
investment dollars and to declines in personal income
tax revenues.2
Instead, NAFTA weakens the capacity of
governments to impose regulations on private investors
- such as environmental taxes, standards, and
emissions controls - since firms can play jurisdictions
off against each other in new ways, producing in and
exporting from the jurisdiction where production costs
are lowest. NAFTA disciplines go beyond those of
GATT in restricting the use of traditional trade
sanctions to defend standards and other environmental
regulations against erosion.
As an example, let us consider a hypothetical
provincial regulation concerning allowable lead
emissions from a smelter, as measured in parts per
CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM CONSTITUTIONNEL
million of lead detected at a high-volume air filter near
the smelter over a certain period of time. In Canada,
regulations of this type are enacted pursuant to a
provincial Environmental Protection Act; some federal
standards and regulations pursuant to the federal
Environmental Protection Act may also apply to
smelter emissions. In very general terms, a challenge
to either the federal or the provincial regulation could
arise under NAFTA on any of several different
grounds (relevant references from the texts of NAFTA
and the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation are listed in footnotes to each):
1) If it were regarded as lenient in comparison
with emissions standards in effect in some
other NAFTA jurisdiction, the lead regulation
could be cited as a government incentive for
metal exports or a discouragement of imports
from other countries where lead standards
were more stringent.'
2) On the other hand, if the regulation were
regarded as stringent in comparison with
other NAFTA jurisdictions, the provincial
standard could be challenged as a restriction
on metal exports.
4
3) Again, if it were regarded as relatively
stringent, the regulation could be cited as a
deterrent to investment in the Canadian
province because, for example, it might
require the prospective investor to employ
pollution control equipment or technologies
not used in the investor's home jurisdiction or
in other NAFTA jurisdictions.'
4) The regulation, whether relatively lax or
stringent, could be viewed as constituting a
disguised restriction on trade in goods or
services .
6
It remains to be seen, of course, whether any of
these positions would be found convincing by a
NAFTA dispute panel or investment tribunal
(composed of experts in international law and
investment).
As noted, a defense of the provincial emissions
standard under NAFTA would have to show that the
standard is adopted in pursuit of a "legitimate
objective" (Article 904.2) and that its implementers
avoid "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination against
goods or services" (Article 907.2), and/or that the
regulation is based on relevant international standards,
affording other NAFTA countries national treatment
and most-favoured nation status.7
In contrast to the Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, which specifically exempts provinces from
the standards chapter, NAFTA states that the federal
government must "seek, through appropriate
measures, to ensure observance" of the bulk of the
standards chapter by provincial and state governments
and by non-governmental standardizing bodies. It is
unclear what the federal government would need to do
to satisfy a NAFTA panel that it had complied with
this provision, in the event of a challenge by another
NAFTA party involving a Canadian provincial
measure.
In none of the situations cited above would the
North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation be particularly relevant. That agreement
sets out dispute proceedings for use when domestic
laws are not being effectively enforced by local
authorities, but does not address dispute resolution in
cases where different jurisdictions simply have
different regulations.
In conclusion, NAFTA's effects on the future of
environmental regulation may be summarized as
follows:
1) The ambiguities in NAFTA regarding
allowable types of environmental regulations
and enforcement procedures make challenges
likely as dispute settlement precedents are
established. This can be expected to have a
chilling effect on jurisdictions' creativity and
initiative in making environmental policy.
2) Private firms have new options for
challenging or evading government policy due
to NAFTA's emphasis on investment and
financial services. This has implications for
both government fiscal capacity in general
and environmental policy in particular.
3) The allocation of government funding for
environmental protection may be skewed by
NAFTA's requirements, especially those
regarding harmonization of standards and
enforcement procedures.
4) Transportation and primary materials
development subsidies are likely to receive an
impetus, influencing overall environmental
policy strategies away from conservation and
throughput-reduction.
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5) NAFTA parties have less flexibility than other
countries to comply with international
environmental agreements which include trade
measures as an enforcement mechanism.
Taken together, these considerations cast a
significant pall on the statement in NAFTA's preamble
that the parties see NAFTA as a way to "promote
sustainable development" and "strengthen the
development and enforcement of environmental laws
and regulations." L3
Patricia E. Perkins
Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University.
Endnotes
1. Many environmental standards are also covered by
NAFTA's section on "Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures," or policies covering the safety of foods and
animal feedstuffs, as well as pest and disease control
measures. NAFTA's rules in this regard, found in
Chapter 7, Section B of the agreement, are somewhat
different than the Standards rules.
2. Bruce Campbell, "Globalization, Trade Agreements, and
Sustainability" in Canadian Environmental Law
Association, The Environmental Implications of Trade
Agreements (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Environment
and Energy, 1993) at 60-61.
3. NAFTA Articles 1902.1, 901.1, 904.4, 309, 315, 905,
907, Annex 2004, and NAAEC Article 3. GATT rules, in
contrast, as found in the Technical Barriers to Trade
agreement, apply to characteristics of traded goods
themselves (not to production process standards). The
GATT panel decision on the tuna-dolphin case
underscores this distinction. See Sandra L. Walker,
Environmental Protection versus Trade Liberalization:
Finding the Balance (Brussels: Publications des Facultds
universitaires Saint-Louis, 1993) at 87-96.
4. NAFTA Articles 309, 315, 904.4, 905, 907, and Annex
2004. GATT contains no similar language regarding
investment or financial flows.
5. NAFTA Articles 1106, 1108, and Annex 2004.
6. NAFTA Articles 904.2, 907.2, and Annex 2004.
7. The dense language of the Standards chapter makes it
likely that disputes will proliferate until some clarity is
provided by successive dispute panels. This, in turn,
may discourage jurisdictions from exploring creative
new environmental policy approaches or simply from
making progressive improvements in their regulations to
maintain or improve environmental quality.
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